Is a Full-Scale Israel-Hezbollah War Getting Closer After the November 2024 Ceasefire?

The question of a Israel Hezbollah war has once again moved to the center of regional debate after a period of gradual escalation that began with the Gaza war and then spread to the Lebanese front through almost daily exchanges of fire. A ceasefire agreement eventually took effect on November 27, 2024, brokered by the United States and France and grounded in UN Security Council Resolution 1701. Yet the agreement did not resolve the underlying conflict; it merely froze its most dangerous manifestations, leaving the Israel-Lebanon border under a fragile deterrence that could break with any major miscalculation.

The central question is therefore not whether a full-scale war has become inevitable, but whether the formula that prevented a major conflict since 2006 is still capable of holding. This report begins with the roots of the conflict, then examines the November 2024 ceasefire framework, adds military estimates from CSIS, provides deeper economic analysis, and outlines detailed military scenarios. It also connects these developments with Lebanon’s diplomatic context, as explored in Lebanon’s diplomatic movements in 2025, and the broader analytical framework found in Global Political Analysis.

The roots of the conflict date back to the early 1980s with the emergence of Hezbollah during Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982. After Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon in 2000, the conflict did not end but instead entered a new phase that culminated in the July 2006 war. UN Resolution 1701 created a framework for halting hostilities and expanding the presence of the Lebanese army and UNIFIL south of the Litani River, but implementation remained partial, leaving the region governed by mutual deterrence rather than a lasting settlement.

After 2006, both sides significantly expanded their capabilities. Israel strengthened its air superiority, intelligence reach, and multi-layered missile defense systems, while Hezbollah accumulated a larger and more diverse rocket arsenal and gained battlefield experience in Syria. This parallel evolution transformed Israel’s northern front into one of the most sensitive flashpoints in the Middle East: both sides possess the capacity to inflict significant damage, yet neither has a guaranteed path to a rapid or low-cost victory.

Israel Hezbollah war after the November 2024 ceasefire

The November 2024 agreement was far from a routine political development. According to Reuters, the deal established a 60-day truce, halted active hostilities, and called for a phased Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon in exchange for stopping armed operations from Lebanese territory against Israel. Reuters also confirmed that the ceasefire took effect at dawn on November 27, 2024. That date is essential because any assessment of later escalation must begin from this framework rather than from a political vacuum.

Within this context, Lebanese parliament speaker Nabih Berri emerged as the main channel of mediation. Reuters described Berri as a key interlocutor between Hezbollah and the United States during the negotiations, giving him a central role in shaping and politically managing the agreement. Reports suggesting that he proposed returning to the November 2024 framework to contain the current escalation should be treated as politically attributed proposals rather than fully confirmed diplomatic initiatives by Western news agencies.

Analytically, returning to the November 2024 arrangement appears logical from a crisis-management perspective. When the previous rules of engagement begin to weaken, reverting to the most recent negotiated framework is often less costly than attempting to construct a new one under fire. Yet this approach faces a clear limitation: the original agreement never fully resolved the definition of violations or bridged the fundamental gap between Lebanese and Israeli interpretations of border security. As a result, returning to the agreement might slow escalation but would not constitute a permanent solution.

Lebanese officials argue that the state complied with the ceasefire while Israeli strikes and violations continued. Israel, on the other hand, maintains that its operations are intended to prevent Hezbollah from rebuilding military infrastructure near the border. Between these competing narratives lies the central dilemma: each side interprets compliance through its own security doctrine. This dynamic means that even a single security incident could quickly transform from a “localized violation” into a broader strategic crisis.

This leads to a critical military question: if the ceasefire collapses, what might actually happen on the battlefield?

CSIS estimates suggest Hezbollah’s arsenal could range between 120,000 and 200,000 rockets and missiles, while the Missile Threat database cites a commonly referenced estimate of about 130,000 projectiles. Many of these are short-range rockets, but analysts warn that Hezbollah has also pursued more precise and longer-range systems. The military implication is not only about accuracy but also about saturation: large-scale rocket launches capable of overwhelming air defenses and placing sustained pressure on civilian infrastructure.

Another CSIS assessment highlights the challenge facing Israeli planners: Hezbollah can combine rockets, drones, and artillery over extended periods. Even if Israeli strikes successfully degrade parts of Hezbollah’s infrastructure, the cost of a prolonged war would remain extremely high. In other words, the next war—if it occurs—will not be measured solely by the number of targets destroyed but by each side’s ability to endure sustained combat.

Israel retains a qualitative advantage in airpower, intelligence, and precision strikes, along with a layered missile defense system including Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and Arrow. Yet technological superiority does not eliminate the cost dilemma. Hezbollah does not need to fully paralyze Israel to claim strategic success; maintaining pressure on northern cities and economic activity could be enough to raise the political and military cost of war. Conversely, Israel’s ability to strike deep into Lebanon does not guarantee a rapid political resolution.

The economic dimension further complicates the equation. According to the World Bank, conflict-related damage and losses in Lebanon had reached roughly $8.5 billion by late 2024. A later assessment estimated total economic impact at around $14 billion, with reconstruction needs of about $11 billion.

For Lebanon, these figures fundamentally reshape the meaning of war. The country would enter any new conflict with an economy already weakened by years of crisis and contraction. A major war could push housing, tourism, trade, infrastructure, and energy sectors deeper into disruption while increasing internal displacement and pressure on public finances.

Israel would also face economic consequences beyond the cost of missile interception. A prolonged conflict could disrupt northern regions, expand evacuation zones, strain supply chains, and increase defense spending. Over time, these pressures could evolve into domestic political challenges.

Regionally, any large-scale escalation along the Lebanese front could ripple through energy markets, shipping routes, and insurance costs across the Middle East—even without escalating into a full regional war. Financial markets often react to perceived risk as much as to actual events.

What military scenarios therefore appear most realistic?

The first scenario is controlled confrontation, where limited strikes and calibrated responses continue without crossing the threshold into full war. This remains the most likely near-term outcome but also the most fragile, as it depends on consistent restraint from both sides.

The second scenario is gradual unintended escalation. Here, neither side initially intends a major war, but a sequence of retaliatory strikes spirals out of control—possibly triggered by a high-profile assassination, a sensitive military target, or significant civilian casualties.

The third scenario is a deliberate large-scale war. Israel might reach this point if it concludes that Hezbollah’s military presence near the border has become strategically intolerable. Hezbollah could escalate if it believes Israeli attacks have crossed an unacceptable threshold. Such a conflict would likely involve extensive air campaigns, sustained missile attacks on Israeli cities, and deeper strikes inside Lebanon.

The fourth scenario is renewed stabilization through diplomacy. This would involve reviving or modifying the November 2024 framework with stronger monitoring mechanisms and clearer definitions of violations. While not a final settlement, it could prolong deterrence and delay a wider conflict.

Ultimately, a full-scale war is not inevitable, but neither is it a remote possibility. The region appears to be shifting from the “post-2006 deterrence model” toward a new and less stable phase shaped by the Gaza war and the November 2024 ceasefire.

From a strategic perspective, proposals to revive the November 2024 agreement may amount to little more than an attempt to buy time. They may reduce immediate tensions, but they cannot prevent war indefinitely unless accompanied by stronger enforcement mechanisms and clearer security arrangements on the ground.

Until such measures emerge, the Lebanese front will remain one of the Middle East’s most volatile flashpoints.